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Fluctuations in investor risk aversion are often cited as a factor explaining crises on ﬁ  nancial markets. The 
alternation between periods of bullishness prompting investors to make risky investments, and periods of 
bearishness, when they retreat to the safest forms of investments, could be at the root of sharp ﬂ  uctuations 
in asset prices. One problem in the assessment of these different periods is clearly distinguishing the risk 
perceived by agents from risk aversion itself.
There are several types of risk aversion indicators used by ﬁ  nancial institutions (the VIX, the LCVI, the GRAI, 
etc.). These indices, which are estimated in diverse ways, often show differing developments, although it 
is not possible to directly assess which is the most accurate. An interesting method in this respect is to 
link the indicators to ﬁ  nancial crises. In principle, ﬁ  nancial crises should coincide with periods in which 
risk aversion increases. Here we estimate probabilities of ﬁ  nancial crises –currency and stock market 
crises– using the different risk aversion indicators as explanatory variables. This allows us to assess their 
respective predictive powers. The tests carried out show that risk aversion does tend to increase before 
crises, at least when it is measured by the most relevant indices. This variable is a good leading indicator 
of stock market crises, but is less so for currency crises.ARTICLES
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F
luctuations in investor risk aversion are often 
cited as a factor to explain crises on ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The alternation between periods 
of optimism prompting investors to make risky 
investments, and periods of pessimism, when they 
retreat to the safest forms of investments, could 
be at the root of sharp ﬂ  uctuations in asset prices. 
One problem in the assessment of these different 
periods is clearly distinguishing the risk perceived 
by agents from risk aversion itself.
The concept of risk aversion has the advantage of 
being intuitive, given that it can easily be interpreted 
as a feeling of wariness on the part of investors 
regarding risky investments. It can also be deﬁ  ned 
more precisely within the framework of asset 
pricing models. In this context, we can decompose 
risk premia on different assets into a “price of risk”, 
which is common to all assets, and a “quantity of 
risk”, which is speciﬁ  c to each asset. Risk aversion 
is often considered to correspond to the “price of 
risk” obtained in this way. This is the deﬁ  nition we 
use here.
In the consumption capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM), the price of risk depends on the variance 
of consumption. It may therefore vary empirically 
if this variance is estimated over different periods. 
In the speciﬁ  c case of the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), the price of risk varies with the variance 
of returns on a representative market portfolio 
(see Appendix 1).
There seems to be a paradox in regarding risk aversion 
as being variable over time when it is deﬁ  ned as a 
structural factor representing agents’ preferences. 
In fact, this paradox stems from the dual use of the 
term “risk aversion”.
• In its narrow sense, the term refers to the risk 
aversion coefﬁ  cient present in the consumer’s utility 
function. This parameter is part of the intrinsic 
proﬁ  le of economic agents and may therefore be 
assumed to be unchanged over time.
• In its broad sense –which is the one used here– risk 
aversion is deﬁ  ned as the “price of risk”. It is a decisive 
factor in the formation of asset prices, and makes it 
possible to reﬂ  ect investor sentiment with regard 
to risk in an ever-changing environment. Another 
advantage of this deﬁ  nition is that it constitutes the 
opposite of the concept of “risk appetite” frequently 
mentioned by market operators.1
There are several types of risk aversion indicators 
in the economic literature. These indicators, which 
are estimated in diverse ways, often show differing 
developments, although it is not possible to directly 
assess which is the most accurate. An interesting 
method in this respect is to link the indicators to 
ﬁ  nancial crises since, in principle, ﬁ  nancial crises 
should be preceded by periods in which risk 
aversion increases. However, it is also possible for 
some ﬁ  nancial crises to be preceded by periods of 
strong “risk appetite” during which investors are 
excessively optimistic, which creates a “speculative 
bubble” on the prices of risky assets.
The ﬁ  rst part of this article describes the indicators 
most commonly used by ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
compares their values over the period July 1995 
to September 2005. The second part estimates 
probabilities of ﬁ  nancial crises –currency and stock 
market crises– using these different indicators. 
The simulations carried out on the sample allow us 
to assess their respective predictive powers.
1| THE MAIN RISK
AVERSION INDICATORS
1|1  Simple and aggregate indicators
SIMPLE INDICATORS, THE VIX
Some analyses use raw series to estimate changes 
in investors’ perception of risk. For instance, the 
price of gold may be used if we assume that, during 
periods of uncertainty, investors will reallocate their 
wealth to assets traditionally perceived as safe, such 
as gold. The same would be true of the Swiss franc 
exchange rate.
The implied volatility of options is also used. 
For example, the volatility index (VIX) created 
1  See Kumar and Persaud (2001), Gai and Vause (2004).ARTICLES
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by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
in 1993 equals the implied volatility on the S&P 500 
(Chart 1). It is regarded by many market analysts as 
a direct gauge of fear.
However, the explanatory power of these indicators 
is limited. Indeed, proxies like the price of gold may 
be inﬂ  uenced by factors that have nothing to do 
with risk aversion. Similarly, a variation in implied 
volatility on a market may stem from a change in the 
quantity of risk on this market and not necessarily 
from a change in investor risk aversion.
AGGREGATE INDICATORS, THE LCVI
Several indicators have been created by aggregating 
elementary series. These measures are relatively 
simple to put in place and can be easily interpreted. 
In most cases, they are weighted averages of a number 
of variables. The best-known indicators of this 
type are JP Morgan’s liquidity, credit and volatility 
index (LCVI), the UBS (Union des Banques Suisses) 
risk index, Merrill Lynch’s ﬁ  nancial stress index 
and the risk perception indicator of the Caisse des 
Dépôts et Consignations.2
We have used the LCVI in our comparison (see Chart 1). 
This is often regarded as being a satisfactory measure 
of risk aversion.3 The LCVI aggregates three types 
of information: ﬁ  rst, two series capturing liquidity 
developments (yield spreads between a benchmark 
and little-traded US Treasury bills and spreads on 
US swaps); second, two risk premia indicators (yield 
spreads on speculative grade corporate bonds and 
the EMBI); and third, three measures regarded in 
this approach as representative of market volatility 
(the VIX, volatility on foreign exchange markets and 
the global risk aversion index –GRAI).
However, these aggregate indicators are limited in 
their power to explain risk perception. The underlying 
elementary variables are inﬂ  uenced by many factors 
other than investors’ propensity to take risks. This 
is not offset by aggregating them, which consists, 
more or less, in calculating an arithmetical average. 
Moreover, the weighting of the different measures 
used is arbitrary. All in all, this approach appears 
based on intuition and lacks a real theoretical basis.
1|2  A common factor driving
 risk  premia
Principal component analysis (PCA) may be applied 
to risk premia in order to identify a common factor 
in their variations (see Box 1). The assumption 
underlying this approach is that the yields on 
different securities are correlated as they depend 
on one or more common factors that are not directly 
observable.
The ﬁ  rst common factor can generally be interpreted 
as the price of risk, if certain conditions are met, 
notably that it increases with each risk premium. 
In fact, this indicator is constructed exactly like a 
weighted average of risk premia, the weighting being 
given by the PCA.
Here, we construct an indicator of this type, referred 
to hereafter as PCA, using the ﬁ  rst component of 
a PCA on several risk premia (see Box 1). The risk 
premia have been chosen so as to be representative 
of the changes observed across the ﬁ  xed income 
market as a whole. These are, on the one hand, 
option adjusted spreads (OAS) on corporate bonds 
2  For more details on these indicators see Prat-Gay and McCormick (1999), Kantor and Caglayan (2002), Germanier (2003), Rosenberg (2003), and Tampereau and 
Teiletche (2001).
3 Dungey  et al. (2003), for example, use it to study changes in risk aversion during the ﬁ  nancial crises in emerging markets.
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(2) Russian crisis and failure of LTCM.
(3) Downtrend on the main stock markets.
Dotted line: terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Sources: CBOE, JP Morgan.ARTICLES
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Box 1
Principles of principal component analysis
This approach is justiﬁ  ed by Ross’s arbitrage pricing theory (APT, 1976). According to this theory, the common variation 
in returns can be expressed as a linear function of a set of factors. However, APT speciﬁ  es neither their number nor their 
nature. This leads to the use of statistical methods, such as principal component analysis (PCA), to identify them. 
PCA  allows us to extract from a set of p quantitative variables correlated among one another a list of k new variables 
called “factors” f1,…, fk (k < p) that are uncorrelated among one another. The common factors are constructed as linear 
combinations of variables. In order to condense the information, only the k ﬁ  rst factors are considered, as they explain, by 
construction, the bulk of total variance. The proportion of total variance accounted for by these k ﬁ  rst factors constitutes 
an overall measure of the quality of the PCA. Choosing how many factors to use is difﬁ  cult. Two criteria are often used to 
make this choice: the Joliffe criterion –which consists in cutting off once the percentage of explained variance reaches 
a certain threshold (for example 80%)– and the Kaiser criterion, which only keeps eigenvalues greater than one if the 
correlation matrix is worked on. 
Examples of use
Sløk and Kennedy (2004) use PCA to identify a common trend in risk premia on stock and bond markets in developed and 
emerging market countries since the beginning of 1998. According to them, the variance-explained weighted average of the 
ﬁ  rst two common factors is strongly correlated with the OECD’s leading indicator of industrial production and a measure of 
global liquidity. In this case, therefore, PCA captures the impact of the risk of the overall macroeconomic environment and 
liquidity risk on changes in risk premia. McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) studied –also using PCA– common developments 
in risk premia in 15 emerging market countries in the period 1997 to 2003. The ﬁ  rst factor, which explains the bulk of the 
common variation, is interpreted as representing the investor risk aversion. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) calculates 
a risk aversion indicator by means of PCA using risk premia on investment and speculative grade corporate bonds in 
developed countries and sovereign risk premia for some Asian and Latin American countries.
Calculation of a PCA indicator on risk premia
The method used here is PCA carried out using a set of 
standardised risk premia (see Appendix 3). The results 
show that the ﬁ  rst factor explains 68% of the common 
variation of risk premia. The correlation of each of the 
risk premia with this ﬁ  rst factor is positive. In addition, 
all of the original risk premia are well represented in 
this ﬁ   rst factor, the weightings being of comparable 
order of magnitude; there is therefore no problem of 
over- or under-representation of certain series. For these 
reasons, we can consider that this ﬁ  rst common factor 
gives a good representation of risk aversion.
The second factor explains 19% of the common 
variation of risk premia. We analyse it since it 
satisﬁ   es the Joliffe  criterion, at the 80% threshold, 
and the  Kaiser  criterion. This second factor is 
negatively correlated with a measure of global liquidity. 
This is proxied here by the inverse of average short-term rates of the four largest economies (United States, euro area, 
United Kingdom and Japan), weighted by GDP (the correlation coefﬁ  cient is equal to -0.69). We also note a high positive 
correlation between the second factor and swap spreads, which are often regarded as being strongly inﬂ  uenced by global 
liquidity developments.
Second component of the PCA 
compared with a measure of global liquidity
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and swap spreads for the major developed markets; 
on the other, the EMBI Global sovereign spread and 
a corporate spread for emerging market economies.4
Details of these series are given in Appendix 3. The 
estimation period is from December 1998, when the 
indices used for emerging market countries were 
introduced, to December 2005 (Chart 2).
1|3  Indicators of the GRAI type
PRINCIPLES OF CALCULATION
Theoretically, an increase in risk aversion should 
lead to an increase in risk premia across all markets, 
but the increase should be greater on the riskiest 
markets. This is the idea on which the global risk 
aversion index (GRAI) is based, devised by Persaud 
(1996). Changes in risk aversion are represented by 
the correlation between price variations of different 
securities and their volatility: if the correlation 
is positive, risk aversion has decreased; if the 
correlation is negative, it has increased (for a more 
detailed presentation, see Appendix 2).
In practice, if we wish the GRAI to increase with risk 
aversion, the correlation must be given a negative 
sign.5 Instead of a correlation, a regression coefﬁ  cient 
between price variations and volatilities may also be 
used (which is also given a negative sign). The indicator 
is then called the risk aversion index (RAI).6
In order to be entirely rigorous, conﬁ  dence intervals 
need to be constructed around the estimated values. 
When this is done, GRAI indicators are often found 
to be in a non-signiﬁ  cant area.7 However, it must 
be admitted that these conﬁ  dence intervals are not 
calculated for other risk aversion indicators.
Kumar and Persaud (2001) applied this approach to 
ex post excess returns on foreign exchange markets. 
Several ﬁ  nancial institutions and private banks, 
such as the IMF and JP  Morgan, subsequently 
constructed their own GRAI. Others like Credit 
Suisse First Boston8 and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
have constructed RAIs.
LIMITATIONS OF ITS USE
From a theoretical standpoint, the construction is 
based on simplifying assumptions that are probably 
not borne out in reality, notably, the independence 
of excess returns and the independence between 
expected future prices and variations in risk aversion. 
Another limitation of this indicator is that it does not 
measure levels of risk aversion but rather changes in 
it. The correlation coefﬁ  cient only makes it possible 
to distinguish periods in which risk aversion has 
increased from those in which it has fallen.
From an empirical point of view, the GRAI and 
RAI also display some limitations. Firstly, the 
measurements show that these indicators are 
extremely volatile. This seems counter-intuitive, as a 
good indicator should be stable during quiet periods. 
Secondly, changes in the indicator over time differ 
quite markedly depending on the period chosen for 
the calculations of volatility of returns as well as on 
the market concerned. 
Chart 2
Risk aversion indicator 
measured by the ﬁ  rst component of the PCA














(2) Russian crisis and failure of LTCM.
(3) Downtrend on the main stock markets.
Dotted line: terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch.
4  Risk premia on stock markets are not used on account of the great disparity in results obtained using the principal methods, which are mainly based on 
the Gordon-Shapiro model but with different underlying assumptions.
5  Spearman’s correlation is often used, which is a correlation between ranks of variables.
6  See Wilmot, Mielczarski and Sweeney (2004).
7  More than half of the values in Kumar and Persaud’s study (2001).
8  See Wilmot, Mielczarski and Sweeney (2004).ARTICLES
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CALCULATION OF A CURRENCY
AND STOCK MARKET GRAI
We calculate the GRAI and RAI for the foreign 
exchange and stock markets using monthly data. 
The currency GRAI is equal to the correlation 
(which is given a negative sign) between excess 
returns and volatility (see Chart 3). The sample 
comprises 12 to 15 currencies quoted against the 
US dollar depending on the periods for which data 
are available (Appendix 3). Excess returns are equal 
to the spread between the 3-month forward rate and 
the actual spot rate three months later. Volatility is 
calculated over the two previous years.
The stock market GRAI is equal to the correlation 
(given a negative sign) between price changes 
over three months and their volatilities, calculated 
over the two previous years (Chart 4). The sample 
is made up of the main stock market indices 
of 27 developed and emerging economies. The 
currency and stock market RAIs are calculated in 
the same way as the GRAIs, by replacing the rank 
correlation by the regression slope.
STATE STREET INDEX
The State Street index (SST) is based on a measure 
in volume terms rather than prices.9 This index, 
which was created in 1998, can be regarded as a 
GRAI calculated in terms of quantity. A rise in it 
corresponds to an increase in risky assets in the 
portfolio of a range of investors. It thus points to a 
trend of growing risk appetite, and a fall signals the 
reverse. In order to compare it directly with other 
risk aversion indicators, we give it a negative sign.
The index is calculated every month using State 
Street’s proprietary database on the portfolios 
of institutional investors (see Chart 5). Like the 
other indicators in this category, this tool has the 
Chart 3
GRAI and RAI calculated on the foreign exchange market
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(2) Russian crisis and failure of LTCM.
(3) Downtrend on the main stock markets.
Dotted line: terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 4
GRAI and RAI calculated on the stock market
1996 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(3) (1)



























(2) Russian crisis and failure of LTCM.
(3) Downtrend on the main stock markets.
Dotted line: terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 5
State Street index (given a negative sign)















(2) Russian crisis and failure of LTCM.
(3) Downtrend on the main stock markets.
Dotted line: terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Source: State Street.
9  See Froot and O’Connell (2003).ARTICLES
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advantage of being simple and can provide useful 
indices; however, it shows up trends that are not 
solely a reﬂ  ection of risk aversion.
1|4 Other  measures
Another category of indicators is obtained by 
comparing risk-neutral probabilities, calculated 
on options prices, with investors’ subjective 
probabilities. We have not used this type of indicator 
here as it is tricky to estimate empirically subjective 
probabilities using historical data.10 We have not 
used either in our comparison indicators based on 
the optimisation under constraint of a consumption 
model, of which the Goldman Sachs indicator is an 
example.11 Indeed, many studies have shown that 
consumption models underperform models that use 
market data such as the CAPM.
1|5  Comparison of the indicators
The different indicators react more or less to periods 
of crisis, identiﬁ  ed in Charts 1 to 5 by vertical 
columns. Prior to the Asian crisis in 1997 and the 
Russian crisis in the summer of 1998, the VIX and 
LCVI show a rise in risk aversion.12 However, the 
GRAI and RAI do not display any very clear trend. 
During the stock market crisis in the early 2000s, 
several indicators signal an increase in risk aversion: 
the PCA, the GRAI and the RAI (which are positive 
as they point to a rise in risk aversion). The VIX, 
LCVI and SST do not show any very clear trend. 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 coincide 
with a peak of risk aversion in the VIX, the LCVI 
and the PCA. The other indicators do not record any 
particular change at this time.
One reassuring point to be underlined, however, 
is that these indicators are positively correlated 
between one another, even if the variations in them 
differ. The cross-correlations of these indicators show 
that 21 out of 28 of these correlations are positive 
(Table 1). Of the seven remaining, only three are 
signiﬁ  cantly different from zero.
2| PREDICTIVE POWER
OF THE INDICATORS
We attempt here to determine whether the risk 
aversion indicators described above can serve as 
leading indicators of crises, and whether they can 
help to improve forecasts using existing models. We 
carry out two estimates: on the foreign exchange 
market and on the stock market. Theoretically, 
investor risk aversion is the same on all markets, 
as a rational investor maximises his expected gains 
by making investment choices across all types of 
assets. We will therefore use the same risk aversion 
indicators, except for the GRAI where we have
two distinct indicators.
Much work has been done to attempt to construct 
“leading indicators” of crises, notably after the 
Mexican crisis in 1995.13 The idea underlying this 
research has been to identify economic variables 
that behave in a particular way prior to periods of 
crisis. Their aim is to assess probabilities of crisis 
at a speciﬁ  c horizon (generally one or two years), 
taking account of the information available on 
the economic variables. Most of them use logit 
models that link a qualitative endogenous variable 
10 See  Tarashev  et al. (2003), Scheicher (2003), Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004); for a survey, see Gai and Vause (2004).
11  See Ades and Fuentes (2003).
12  In the case of the LCVI, only the Russian crisis is concerned, as the series is only available from the end of 1997.
13  See for example Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), Berg and Patillo (1999), or Bussière and Fratzscher (2002).
Table 1









PCA VIX LCVI SST
Currency
GRAI 0.08 0.85 *** 0.07 0.00 -0.19 ** 0.08 0.03
Stock
market
GRAI 0.18 * 0.85 *** 0.59 *** 0.31 *** 0.36 *** -0.25
Currency
RAI 0.15 0.11 -0.13 0.13 -0.07
Stock
market
RAI 0.45 *** 0.20 * 0.26 ** -0.27
PCA 0.84 *** 0.50 *** -0.48 ***
VIX 0.55 *** -0.32 *
LCVI 0.00
Signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the * 90%, ** 95%, or *** 99% conﬁ  dence levels.ARTICLES
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(crisis or quiet period) to a set of quantitative 
exogenous variables.14 These models are estimated 
for a large number of countries and periods. We use 
the same method here.
2|1  The method used
In order to construct leading indicators of crises, an 
essential ﬁ  rst step is to identify the crisis periods that 
occurred in the sample under review (Box 2). Crisis 
periods are identiﬁ  ed by so-called “simultaneous” 
indicators, which will be used to construct the 
model’s dependent variable. Next, in order to assess 
the power of different risk aversion indicators to 
predict crises, they need to be compared with the 
indicators generally used.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
For currency crises, most studies use the same 
explanatory variables in their model.15 Here we 
tried out a number of variables and used those that 
are signiﬁ  cant for our sample. These are the real 
exchange rate (against the dollar for Asian and Latin 
American countries and against the euro for European 
countries, quoted indirectly, with an increase 
corresponding to a depreciation of the emerging 
economy’s currency); ofﬁ  cial international reserves 
as a ratio of broad money, in year-on-year terms; 
and the interest rate on the money market taken 
in real terms. For the stock market, the explanatory 
variables used are the following:16 the price earning 
ratio (PER) in level terms, the year-on-year change 
in stock prices, and real interest rates.17
The explanatory variables are then introduced 
into the model in several stages to see whether 
the risk aversion indicators improve forecasts (see 
Box 3). Three models are tested in turn. Model (1) 
is referred to as the “base” and includes the usual 
explanatory variables without the risk aversion 
indicators. Model (2) adds the different indicators 
in turn. Model (3) only includes a risk aversion 
indicator as explanatory variable.
SAMPLE USED
The sample of panel data includes monthly data 
for the period from July 1995 to September 2005 
for 20 emerging countries for currency crises and 
27 countries for stock market crises. The countries 
and exact sources of the series are given in 
Appendix 3.
The aim is to compare the results obtained with 
these three types of model. To do this, the estimation 
sample must be identical. However, as some of 
our indicators (LCVI, PCA and SST) start later –in 
December 1998– we estimate models (2) and (3), 
which use these variables over this truncated period. 
In order to be able to compare them with the base 
models, we re-estimate this model over the same 
period.
2|2 Currency  crises
The explanatory variables of currency crises have 
the expected signs (see Table 2). Appreciation of 
the real exchange rate is supposed to increase the 
risk of crisis, which corresponds to the negative 
sign found. A fall in international reserves relative 
to broad money also increases the probability of a 
crisis, hence the negative sign. The sign is positive 
on the real interest rate, an increase in which may 
signal a central bank’s difﬁ  culty in maintaining 
the currency’s parity. These three variables are 
signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the 99% level 
over the two estimation periods. The estimates 
are markedly more fragile for the shorter period 
as the number of crises is smaller, falling from 
18 to 7.
The risk aversion variables all have the positive 
sign expected, with a rise in them contributing to 
increasing the probability of a crisis, except for the 
SST index. They appear very signiﬁ  cant in regressions 
over the longer period. This is the case for the VIX, 
the GRAI and the RAI. In the estimates for the shorter 
period, only the PCA is signiﬁ  cant at 99%.
14  See Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), or Radelet and Sachs (1998).
15  For an exhaustive list, see Berg and Patillo (1999).
16  Among those proposed by Boucher (2004).
17  All of these explanatory variables have been standardised  for each country in order to obtain homogenous data for all countries.ARTICLES
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Box 2
Deﬁ  nition of crises
Currency crises
There is abundant literature on currency crises, which makes it possible to construct simultaneous crisis indicators. Most 
of them are obtained by statistical analysis of exchange rate and ofﬁ  cial international reserves series. The usual method 
consists in ﬁ  rst of all constructing “pressure on the foreign exchange market” indicators, which correspond to a weighted 
average of the currency’s depreciation and relative losses in international reserves (see, for example, Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco, 1996, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1997, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998, Bussière and Fratzscher, 
2002). The weighting used between the two series is generally inversely proportional to their conditional variance. When 
the pressure indicator goes above a certain threshold, it is deemed that there is a currency crisis. The threshold used is 
generally two or three standard deviations above the mean. The greater the number of standard deviations, the smaller the 
number of identiﬁ  ed crises. Here we calibrate the number of standard deviations, so that all of the crises detected coincide 
with known crises on the markets and vice versa.
The sample used is described in Appendix 3. The reference currency to measure depreciation is the dollar for all the 
currencies of Latin America and Asia, regarded as being more or less part of a “dollar area”. In the case of European 
currencies, we have used the euro (and the Deutsche mark before 1999) except when the currency was pegged to another 
currency. When currencies were pegged to a basket, it is the change relative to this basket that is considered (for example, 
Hungary and Poland from July 1995 to December 1999).Countries that have had periods of hyperinﬂ  ation (inﬂ  ation higher 
than 150% in the six preceding months) are given particular treatment; this is the case for Bulgaria and Romania in our 
sample. In this case, we divide the sample in two: a sub-period of normal inﬂ  ation and another of hyperinﬂ  ation, as the 
measurement of averages and standard deviations is different for these two types of period.1
With a threshold set at three standard deviations above average, the indicator thus constructed allows us to identify only 
known currency crises –such as those in the Asian countries in the second half of 1997 or in Brazil in January 1999 and 
Argentina in January 2002. In total, 18 crises are detected, that is, an average 0.9 crisis per country.
Stock market crises 
There are fewer studies that address stock market crises. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to deﬁ  ne a stock market crisis 
as a sharp and rapid drop in share prices or in an index.2 Two methods are used. Mishkin and White (2002) identify crises 
as falls in the price of a security or an index below a certain threshold (set arbitrarily at 20%) over a chosen time period 
(which may be a week, a month, a year, etc.)
Patel and Sarkar’s approach (1998) consists in calculating an indicator, the CMAX, which detects extreme price levels 
over a given period (24 months, for example). This involves dividing the current price by the maximum price over the 
period: CMAXt = Pt / max [Pt–24,...,Pt] where Pt is the stock price at time t. This indicator equals 1 if prices rise over the 
period considered. The more prices fall, the closer it gets to 0. The threshold used is generally equal to the mean less two 
or three standard deviations. Given the indicator’s construction, the fall in share prices is already well under way when it 
signals a crisis. It is not, therefore, the turning point that is identiﬁ  ed, but rather the point at which there has already been
an abnormal drop in prices. On the other hand, the advantage of this indicator is that it only identiﬁ  es conﬁ  rmed crises that
wipe out a substantial share of the gains made over the two previous years.
Over our sample (see Appendix 3), by using a threshold of two standard deviations below the mean, we identify crises 
that correspond to recognised events over the period.3 There are 30 crises in the sample, i.e. an average of 1.1 crises 
per country. They all occur during the stock market fall in the early 2000s.
1  The average and standard deviation are calculated by dividing the sample for hyperinﬂ  ation countries. At the start of the period, they are calculated on data from 
August 1993 to December 1997, then conditionally, by gradually adding a month to the sample. We add an extra criterion to avoid counting the same crisis several 
times: if a crisis is detected wihin a 12-month period following another crisis, it is automatically cancelled out.
2  An alternative approach consists in seeking to detect the bursting of speculative bubbles, deﬁ  ned as the emergence of a substantial and lasting deviation of a share 
price or index from its fundamental price, followed by an adjustment period then a return to the fundamental equilibrium. The difﬁ  culty in applying this method 
lies in the practical determination of the fundamental value as well as the econometric identiﬁ  cation of these bubbles (Boucher, 2004).
3  In order to have a sufﬁ  ciently large sample, the mean and standard deviation are ﬁ  rst calculated over ten years from March 1995 to March 2005, and then 
conditionally by gradually adding a month at a time to the sample. As with currency crises, if a crisis is detected within a 12-month period following another crisis, 
it is automatically cancelled out.ARTICLES
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The different models are then simulated over the 
sample period. The results give the estimated 
probabilities of a crisis. In order to obtain crisis 
predictions, a probability threshold needs to be set, 
above which it is decided that a crisis is predicted by 
the model. Here we have used 20%.18
The ﬁ   rst estimate for the period July  1995 to 
September  2005 gives much better results as 
far as the quality of forecasting is concerned. 
Sixty-one percent of crises are correctly predicted 
by the base model. In the second estimate, which 
starts in December 1998, the number of crisis periods 
18  This level is comparable to those chosen in similar studies (see, for example, Berg and Patillo, who review existing models in order to compare them and set 
thresholds at 25% and 50%). This threshold is not an intrinsic feature of the model; it merely serves to present the results. By setting it at a low level, as we do here, 
the probability estimated by the model has more chance of exceeding this threshold and therefore the number of crises predicted is greater. However, the number of 
“false alarms”, i.e. the number of wrongly predicted crises also increases.
Box 3
Models used to predict crises
The dependent variable: creation of pre- and post-crisis windows
Using the crises deﬁ  ned above, we construct an indicator denoted Ii,t composed solely of 0 and 1. It equals 1 for 
the 12 months preceding crises and the crisis itself; 0 in quiet periods. The 11 months following the crisis are excluded 
from the sample as the post-crisis period is irrelevant for the estimates and may even distort estimates if it is aggregated 
with quiet periods. This is the indicator used as a dependent variable in the regressions that follow. In seeking to estimate 
the probability that the variable Ii,t is equal to 1, we estimate the probability of a crisis within a one-year horizon. Using a 
misnomer, we refer to this indicator Ii,tas a “crisis indicator”.
Logit estimates
We carry out three types of estimate in turn. First, we estimate the base model, using the explanatory variables generally 
used to predict crises. This model is as follows:
Pr(I





where Ii,t  is the crisis indicator variable described above X
i,t
k
the explanatory variables, f a logistical function 




Given the construction of our indicator Ii,t, this model directly estimates the probability of a crisis at a one-year horizon.
Secondly, we estimate the same equation by adding a risk aversion indicator λtamong the explanatory variables:
Pr(I








We try out, in turn, the VIX, the LCVI, PCA, the GRAI, the RAI and the SST as the risk aversion indicator λt.
Thirdly, we estimate the same model with the risk aversion indicator as the only explanatory variable:
 Pr(  Ii,t = 1) = f(α0 + αn+1λt)) (3)
In order to be entirely rigorous, to obtain genuine crisis “predictions”, we would have to estimate the models over given period,
then simulate them “out-of-sample”, that is, over a period subsequent to the estimates. Here we have estimated and simulated 
the probability of crises over the same period. The availability of our data is too limited to be able to shorten the estimation
period. In addition, it would have been difﬁ  cult to use this as a basis to assess the model’s power to predict crises, as the sample 
includes very few crises at the end of the period. In this text, however, using a misnomer, we speak of the model’s «predictive
power» to refer to the adequacy of the values estimated by the model for the occurrence of crises within the sample.ARTICLES
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Table 2
Logit estimates, currency crises









Constant 1.50 *** 1.17 *** 1.43 *** 0.29 ***
Real exchange rate -4.47 *** -5.21 *** -4.42 *** -4.26 ***
Reserves/M2 -0.96 *** -0.97 *** -0.92 *** -0.92 ***
Real interest rate 1.19 *** 1.12 *** 1.21 *** 1.21 ***
Risk aversion 
indicator 0.05 *** 0.26 *** 0.86 ***
Log likelihood -508.2 -502.9 -504.0 -501.4
Pseudo R² 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 61.2% 62.9% 62.5% 63.4%
False alarms
b) 59.1% 57.8% 58.8% 57.6%









Constant -0.20 -0.07 2.03 ** -2.83 *
Real exchange rate -2.93 *** -2.86 *** -5.43 *** -3.35 ***
Reserves/M2 -0.89 *** -0.91 *** -0.93 *** -0.93 ***
Real interest rate 1.76 *** 0.78 *** 0.60 *** 0.72 ***
Risk aversion 
indicator 0.00 0.34 *** -0.03 *
Log likelihood -289.6 -289.6 -249.1 -256.0
Pseudo R² 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 24.1% 24.1% 26.6% 26.6%
False alarms
b) 65.5% 66.1% 61.1% 65.0%
Signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the * 90%, ** 95%, *** and 99% conﬁ  dence 
levels (Student’s t).
a) Number of crises predicted correctly as a % of total number of crises.
b) Number of crises wrongly predicted as a % of the number of crises predicted.
Table 3
Logit estimates, model (3), currency crises
(estimation period: 07/1995 – 09/2005, number of observations = 2,255)
VIX GRAI RAI
Constant -2.80 *** -2.20 *** -2.20 ***
Risk aversion 
indicator 0.03 *** 1.11 *** 0.35 ***
Log likelihood -647.2 -732.0 -736.9
Pseudo R² 0.00 0.01 0.01
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 0.0% 0.9% 0.0%
False alarms
b) na 88.9% na
(estimation period: 12/1998 – 09/2005, number of observations = 1,543)
LCVI ACP SST
Constant -3.24 *** -3.00 *** -4.54 ***
Risk aversion 
indicator 0.00 0.15 *** -0.02
Log likelihood -311.1 -307.3 -311.1
Pseudo R² 0.00 0.01 0.00
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
False alarms
b) na na na
Signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the * 90%, ** 95%, *** and 99% conﬁ  dence 
levels (Student’s t).
a) Number of crises predicted correctly as a % of total number of crises.
b) Number of crises wrongly predicted as a % of the number of crises predicted.
na: No crisis predicted by the model.
19  Unlike in the previous case, shortening the estimation period does not reduce the quality of the estimates or forecasts. Indeed, the number of crises in the sample is 
not affected if we start our estimates in December 1998, given that all of the stock market crises took place in the early 2000s. As a result, here we only present the 
results for the shorter period, which makes it possible to compare the accuracy of the different indicators directly.
in the sample is considerably lower, with the Asian 
crises in 1997 notably disappearing from the sample. 
This leads to difﬁ  culty in estimating these crisis periods 
correctly. The ratio of correctly predicted crises then 
falls to 24%. The ratio of false alarms (number of false 
alarms relative to the total number of crises) for the 
two estimation periods is 59% and 66% respectively 
(see Table 2).
Introducing a risk aversion indicator makes it possible 
to improve the model’s forecasts. This improvement 
is marginal when the model is estimated on the 
ﬁ  rst period: the three indicators increase the ratio 
of correctly predicted crises by only 1%-2.5%, and 
reduce by only 1% the ratio of false alarms. By contrast, 
over the reduced period, given that the base model 
yields poor results, the improvement provided by the 
indicators is substantial, except in the case of the SST. 
When they are introduced into the regressions, the 
risk aversion indicators are signiﬁ  cant, except for 
the LCVI and the SST (see Table 3). However, their 
power to predict currency crises is nil.
2|3  Stock market crises
All of the explanatory variables introduced into the 
base model of stock market crises are signiﬁ  cant 
(see Table 4).19 The sign is positive for the PER, an 
increase in which may indicate an overvaluation of 
stock prices. It is negative for returns, which already 
tend to decline at the onset of the crisis, as well as 
for real interest rates.
When they are introduced into the regressions on 
stock market crises, the risk aversion indicators 
are signiﬁ  cant and positive, both with the other 
explanatory variables (Table 4) or when taken 
alone (Table 5). Here again, the SST is the only 
exception. ARTICLES
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Table 5
Logit estimates, Model (3), stock market crises
(estimation period: 12/1998 – 09/2005, number of observations = 1,950)
VIX GRAI RAI
Constant -4.86 *** -1.66 *** -1.54 ***
Risk aversion indicator 0.14 *** 1.78 *** 0.97 ***
Log likelihood -784.4 -822.9 -816.0
Pseudo R² 0.09 0.05 0.06
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 43.3% 56.7% 66.4%
False alarmsb) 77.5% 73.2% 70.6%
(estimation period: 12/1998 – 09/2005, number of observations = 1,950)
LCVI ACP SST
Constant -1.44 *** -2.40 *** -6.94 ***
Risk aversion indicator -0.00 0.68 *** -0.06 ***
Log likelihood -871.4 -669.1 -848.2
Pseudo R² 0.01 0.21 0.02
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 0.0% 74.5% 26.5%
False alarms
b) na 61.9% 84.1%
Signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the * 90%, ** 95%, *** and 99% conﬁ  dence 
levels (Student’s t).
a) Number of crises predicted correctly as a % of total number of crises.
b) Number of crises wrongly predicted as a % of the number of crises predicted.
na: No crisis predicted by the model.
The base model predicts 84.4% of stock market 
crises, with a false alarm ratio of 49.9%. Added into 
a regression with the other explanatory variables, 
the risk aversion indicators lightly increase these 
good results in terms of prediction (Table 4). When 
they are taken alone, all the risk aversion indicators 
also obtain good results, with the exception of the 
LCVI (see Table 5). The GRAI and RAI have fairly 
similar predictive powers, with 56% to 67% of crises 
correctly predicted and around 70% of false alarms. 
The VIX and SST yield much less good results.
The interpretation of these good results should, 
however, be put in perspective, recalling that it is not 
the turning point that is predicted by the model, but 
a point when the drop in stock prices is already such 
that the situation is “abnormal”. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that risk aversion has already started 
to increase before the crisis thus deﬁ  ned breaks out. 
Predicting turning points would be quite a different 
exercise.
On this basis, the PCA performs best, it being the 
only one to correctly predict 74.5% of the crises in 
the sample, with a false alarm ratio of 61.9%. How 
can the PCA’s good performance, which is repeated 
when it is introduced alone in the regression (Table 5) 
or added to the other explanatory variables (Table 4), 
be explained? As the PCA is a linear combination 
of the eight spreads on which it is calculated, we 
may wonder whether the estimates would be further 
improved by replacing this variable in regressions (2) 
and (3) by the spreads themselves. The results 
(not detailed here due to lack of space) show that 
the eight spreads give estimates that are more or 
less equivalent to those obtained with the PCA. For 
Model (2), they succeed in predicting 88.2% of crises 
(compared to 86.6% for the PCA), with 44.7% false 
alarms (compared to 48.5% for the PCA). In Model (3), 
the eight spreads allow us to obtain a result of 76.3% 
of crises predicted correctly (compared to 74.5% 
for the PCA), with 50.6% false alarms (compared to 
61.9% for the PCA). Overall, the predictions obtained 
with the PCA or the eight spreads together are more 
or less equivalent. Using a synthetic indicator such 
as the PCA is therefore preferable.
It appears then that risk aversion plays a part in 
stock market crises and that it is indeed captured by 
certain indicators. Their contribution is, however, 
small compared with the other explanatory 
factors.
Table 4
Logit estimates, stock market crises









Constant -2.97 *** -3.79 *** -2.96 *** -2.84 ***
PER 0.43 *** 0.42 *** 0.46 *** 0.44 ***
Returns -2.33 *** -2.18 *** -2.22 *** -2.22 **
Real interest rate -0.20 ** -0.23 *** -0.25 *** -0.25 ***
Risk aversion 
indicator 0.04 *** 1.27 *** 0.60 ***
Log likelihood -555.5 -552.1 -540.6 -538.8
Pseudo R² 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 84.4% 84.4% 86.0% 84.1%
False alarms
b) 49.9% 48.8% 48.3% 48.1%









Constant -2.97 *** -2.51 *** -3.37 *** -5.74 ***
PER 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.43 *** 0.42 ***
Returns -2.33 *** -2.36 *** -1.80 *** -2.28 ***
Real interest rate -0.20 ** -0.16 * -0.33 *** -0.21 **
Risk aversion 
indicator -0.01 ** 0.53 *** -0.03 ***
Log likelihood -555.5 552.5 -497.0 -552.2
Pseudo R² 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.34
Crises predicted 
correctly
a) 84.4% 84.8% 86.6% 84.4%
False alarms
b) 49.9% 50.0% 48.5% 48.9%
Signiﬁ  cantly different from zero at the * 90%, ** 95%, *** and 99% conﬁ  dence 
levels (Student’s t).
a) Number of crises predicted correctly as a % of total number of crises.
b) Number of crises wrongly predicted as a % of the number of crises predicted.ARTICLES
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Empirical risk aversion indicators are supposed to provide a synthetic indication of market sentiment with 
regard to risk. The tests conducted in this article show that risk aversion does indeed tend to increase 
before crises, at least when measured by the most relevant indicators. In other words, these indicators 
are signiﬁ  cant in the regressions explaining the periods preceding ﬁ  nancial crises. A rise in them also 
contributes to increasing the probability of a crisis. The fact that risk aversion is particularly high just before 
crises is consistent with the intuitive deﬁ  nition of this concept.
The predictive power of these indicators for currency crises is small. By contrast, in the case of stock market crises, 
most of the risk aversion indicators tested allow satisfactory results to be obtained. The best results regarding 
the prediction of stock market crises are obtained using principal component analysis on risk premia.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX 1
Theoretical framework
Review of a base model for asset prices: the CCAPM
We consider an investor who freely buys or sells an asset. To keep it simple, we assume that there is a single 
risky asset, two periods, constant consumer prices and a utility function that is separable over time. The investor 
must therefore maximise his utility by choosing an optimal quantity of asset to buy in the ﬁ  rst period. The 













We denote consumption as ct in t, non-ﬁ  nancial revenue as yt, the price of the asset as pt, gross income from 
the asset xt+1 and the quantity of asset bought in t as ξ. δ is the intertemporal discount factor, which captures 
the consumer’s preference for present.










The asset price expressed in equation (2) can be interpreted as the expected income xt+1, discounted by a 
discount factor, denoted mt+1 and referred to as the “stochastic discount factor”:
 p t = Et(mt+1xt+1) (3)
 with
 m t+1 = δ [u’(ct+1)/u’(ct)] (4)
Using the stochastic discount factor involves weighting income on the asset differently depending on the relative 
marginal utility of consumption over the two periods. If consumption in t + 1 is high compared to that in t,
given that marginal utility diminishes, the discount factor is small. This means that the income arising from 
the asset in this case is weighted less. Conversely, if consumption is low, income from the asset is high for the 
consumer, who gives it greater weighting.
To express the risk premia, it is necessary to derive the gross return on the asset. To do so, we divide income 
xt+1 by the price pt ((i.e. Rt+1 = xt+1/pt ). We obtain:
  1 = E(mt+1 Rt+1) (5)
Risk-free asset
By deﬁ  nition, the income from a risk-free asset does not vary with states of the world, which amounts to saying 
that the risk-free rate in t+1, denoted Rf
t+1 , is known in advance:
1 = E(mt+1Rf
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Risk premium
By deﬁ  nition, the risk premium equals the difference E(R t+1 ) – Rf
t+1, i.e. the expected excess return on the 
risky asset compared to that on the risk-free asset.
Considering equations (5) 20 and (6), we have:
 E(Rt+1) – Rf
t+1= – cov [mt+1, Rt+1] Rf
t+1 (7)
The risk premium therefore equals minus the covariance of the return on the risky asset with the stochastic 
discount factor multiplied by the risk-free rate.
Price and quantity of risk






























which can be written in the form:
 E(Ri
t+1) = Rf
t+1+ βi,m λm (10)
with :











We can consider that λm is the price of risk, which is common to all assets, and that βi,m is the speciﬁ  c quantity 
of risk associated with each asset.
Often, the price of risk  λmis regarded as corresponding to risk aversion. We do the same in this article. However, 
to avoid any confusion, it needs to be distinguished from the parameter of risk aversion in the consumer’s 
utility function.
Distinction between the risk aversion parameter in the utility function and the price of risk




1 – γ , where γ  is the coefﬁ  cient of relative risk 
aversion. The stochastic discount factor is then written:
mt+1 = δ (ct+1/ct)–γ (13)
20  Which can be developed using the deﬁ  nition of covariance , cov(mt+1, Rt+1) = E(mt+1, Rt+1) – E(mt+1) E(Rt+1).ARTICLES
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The expected return and price of risk depend on the rate of growth in consumption, denoted ∆c:
 E(Ri
t+1) = Rf
t+1+ βi,∆c λ∆c (14)
λ∆c= γ var (∆c)
The price of risk  λ∆c is determined by the risk aversion parameter γ and by the volatility of consumption. 
Expected returns increase linearly with their betas and the volatility of consumption.
Consistency with the CAPM
The CCAPM model may be regarded as being a general representation from which the other models currently 
used to determine asset prices can be deduced. The CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) may be 
considered a particular case of the CCAPM. We therefore express the stochastic discount factor depending 
on the return, denoted Rw
t+1, on the “wealth portfolio” held by the consumer. This return Rw thus serves to 
approximate the marginal utility of consumption:
mt+1 = a – bRw
t+1 (15)
a and b are parameters > 0
It is then possible to approximate Rw by the return on a broad portfolio of stocks regarded as the market portfolio. 
This can be a large stock index such as the EuroStoxx 50 or the S&P 500. This assumes that the consumer’s 
wealth is invested across the whole of the market. If the return on the market portfolio is denoted Rm the 
stochastic discount factor will then be:
mt+1 = a – bRm
t+1 (16)
This formulation is consistent with the previous model of consumption in which the market return plays a 
similar role to that of changes in consumption in the previous model.
Link with a factor model
The stochastic discount rate is expressed as a function of a number of factors f, which may be different from 
consumption or market returns.
mt+1 = ft+1 ’ b (17)
If we consider that factors f are not directly observable, a factor analysis method is needed to estimate them 
(see Cochrane, 2001, p.175).ARTICLES
Can risk aversion indicators anticipate ﬁ  nancial crises?
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 9 • December 2006  85
APPENDIX 2
The GRAI: risk aversion represented by the correlation 
between volatility and price changes
The framework is given by a CAPM model of the type:
 E(Ri
t+1) – Rf
t+1= ρ cov (Ri
t+1, Rm
t+1) (1)
with ρ representing risk aversion and Rm being the return on the market portfolio, equal to the return 










If we add an assumption of independent returns on different markets, the risk premia on each security no 




t+1= ρ cov (Ri
t+1, αi Ri
t+1) = ραi σ2
i (3)




t+1) – R 
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t+1]





Thus, an increase in risk aversion results in an increase in the expected risk premium that is proportional to 
the volatility of the asset’s return, according to equation (4).
By deriving formula (3) in relation to σ2
i, we obtain the change in the risk premium when the asset’s volatility, 
i.e. the risk associated with it, increases:
[E(R
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Equation (5) shows that an increase in an asset’s volatility brings about an increase in the risk premium on this 
asset that is proportional to the risk aversion, but does not depend on the initial volatility.
To calculate GRAI indicators, variations in prices rather than expected excess returns are used, which explains 
the change in sign in the correlation.
The expected return equals the anticipated change in price:
 E(Ri
t+1) = E(P i
t+1) – Pt (6)
By assuming that E(P i




= – α iσ
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i (7)
The GRAI indicator is therefore a correlation with a negative sign between price changes of the different assets 
and their volatility.ARTICLES
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The currency GRAI comprises 12 to 15 currencies quoted against the dollar according to the periods for which 
the data are available: the Norwegian krone, the Czech koruna, the Swedish krona, the Deutsche mark then 
the euro from 1999, the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Hong Kong dollar, the Singapore dollar, the 
New Zealand dollar, the Swiss franc, pound sterling, the Mexican peso, the South African rand, the yen and 
the Polish zloty.
The currency RAI is made up of 12 currencies over the whole period as a different number of series over time 
would produce abrupt changes in the regression coefﬁ  cient, which would distort the calculation.
The stock market GRAI and RAI include the major stock market indices of 27 developed and emerging 
economies: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Components of the PCA
Eight risk premia are used in the PCA. The data are taken from Bloomberg.
• Four OAS corporate bond spreads for the euro area and the United States:21 for each area, one spread for 
investment grade and another for speculative grade. These spreads are calculated by Merrill Lynch.
• Two spreads for emerging markets: ﬁ  rst, the EMBI Global,22 representing the risk premium on their 
dollar-denominated external sovereign debt, calculated since mid-1998 by JP Morgan on a large panel of 
emerging market countries; and second, an index of corporate debt, denominated in dollars or euro and issued 
abroad, of a large number of emerging market countries. This index is calculated by the bank Merrill Lynch 
and satisﬁ  es certain liquidity conditions.
• Two swap spreads, one for the euro area and one for the United States.
Crisis indicators
Currency crises
The countries selected are the following: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
The sample period is from March 1995 to September 2005.
21  For this, we use bonds that have an optional component –the option adjusted duration– to calculate the credit spread between two bonds with the same maturity 
(Lubochinsky, 2002).
22  The Emerging markets bond index Global (EMBI Global) is an index that represents the average price of bonds in emerging market countries.ARTICLES
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The data were taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database for the 1995-2005 period 
as monthly data (quarterly data were made monthly by means of linear interpolation): total reserves minus 
gold, line 1l.d; money, line 34, quasi-money, line 35, to obtain the reserves/M2 ratio; real exchange rate, line ae, 
consumer prices, line 64, to calculate the real exchange rate; and money market rate, lines 60, 60b or 60a 
(depending on the availability of data and in this order of preference), to calculate the real interest rate (with 
the aid of consumer prices).
Stock market crises
The countries selected are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The estimation period is from December 1995 to September 2005. 
The indices, taken from Bloomberg, are the following: DAX (Germany), S&P/TSX Composite (Canada), DJIA 
(United States), CAC 40 (France), OMX Stockholm 30 (Sweden), AEX (Pays-Bas), BEL20 (Belgium), MIB30 (Italia), 
Nikkei (Japan), FTSE 100 (United Kingdom), IBEX 35 (Spain), PSI General (Portugal), OMX Copenhagen 20 
(Denmark), OMX Helsinki (Finland), ATX (Austria), Irish overall (Ireland), OBX (Norway), ASE General 
(Greece), ISE National 100 (Turkey), Johannesburg Stock Exchange (South Africa), S&P/ASX 200 (Australia), 
NZX Top 10 (New Zealand), Hang Seng (Hong Kong), Kuala Lumpur Composite (Malaysia), Jakarta Composite 
(Indonesia), MERVAL (Argentina), BOVESPA Stock (Brazil). The returns have been calculated using these 
indices. The PER on these indices have also been obtained from Bloomberg. Interest rates have been taken 
from the IMF’s IFS database and calculated in the same way as for currency crises.